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*468 Introduction 
Recent cases of pan-European group of companies' insolvencies demonstrate the 
advantage in placing multinational corporate groups (hereinafter "MCGs") under 
insolvency in a single location, de facto subjected to a single supervision and single 
insolvency regime. [FN1] This is particularly favorable for global restructurings and for 
better results in realisations of assets and is specifically relevant when the group formed a 
single business or when constituent companies had significant inter-relations (hereinafter 
"integrated MCGs"). [FN2] Centralising the insolvency process like this holds the 
potential of saving the MCG as a whole, rather than splitting *469 it up into its various 
assets. In addition, this may also reduce the general costs as there is no need for having a 
patchwork of different cases in different countries, thus resulting in better returns to 
creditors. 
However, ascribed to the lack of rules for dealing with affiliated companies, [FN3] 
the EU Regulation [FN4] only provides partial and indirect means for achieving 
centralisation of the insolvency processes. Initially, this is only attainable when all 
companies involved have their centre of main interests ("COMI") [FN5] in the same 
state. Otherwise, if related companies have their COMI in different countries, then under 
the EU Regulation it is impossible to control their insolvencies from a single location and 
the proceedings are then handled separately. In fact, even in the case that all COMIs are 
located within the same boundaries, the proceedings are still separated in the sense that 
administration orders are issued for each company, hence creating a sort of "local" yet 
parallel insolvency proceedings. 
Thus, it is desirable to promote a centralised approach to insolvencies within MCGs, 
most importantly in the sense that the insolvency regime will have the means of 
considering the entire group as a whole rather than looking at each part separately. 
Essentially, it would eliminate the cumbersome evaluation of the COMI of each MCG's 
constituent separately. Rather, the major consideration would be the way the group was 
operated and the inter-relations between its components. As a consequence, the benefits 
of centralisation could be achieved and realised in a parsimonious and predictable way 
and will not need to rely on a more "random" result of having all COMIs of the 
constituent companies located in a single place. Thus, related companies may be linked in 
the course of their insolvency and preferably their insolvency process will be handled 
jointly in a single forum and under a single legal regime. 
However, such centralisation is not necessarily appropriate for every case of 
insolvency within MCGs. Certainly, it was not a mere coincidence that proved the 
centralisation to be so beneficial in the cases mentioned above. It was indeed 
advantageous because the insolvent MCGs were able to benefit from a global 
restructuring or centralised realisation of assets. Typically, this would not be the case 
when the MCG does not form a single business or when its entities are not inter-related. 
Hence, a prerequisite for applying a centralised approach to insolvencies within MCGs is 
that the specific MCG was an integrated one prior to *470 its collapse. More than this 
though, a critical aspect of such a centralised approach concerns the way its application 
accords with fairness considerations and creditors' expectations, which are primary 
considerations of an insolvency system. 
This paper will focus on this paramount issue of fairness to creditors and will try to 
assess how a centralised approach to insolvency within MCGs can answer the crucial 
questions in this respect. More specifically, does a centralised process meet with 
creditors' expectations regarding jurisdiction and correspond with their legitimate 
interests regarding the insolvency location? Furthermore, can it, at the same time, 
overcome forum shopping? Finally, does it enable creditors' involvement in the process 
and provide them with adequate representation? Failing to answer these questions will 
deem a centralised approach unlikely to be of any real advantage to insolvency regimes. 
However, it will be argued in this paper that indeed a centralised approach can adequately 
answer those questions given that it is applied to the appropriate cases. Although it needs 
to overcome certain risks it can ensure the protection of creditors' rights, ultimately 
becoming a creditor's "dream" rather than "nightmare". Still, this outcome will only be 
possible if thorough consideration will be given to certain essential characteristics of the 
approach which will be introduced into our discussion. Eventually, it will be clear how a 
centralised approach may in fact better reflect creditors' rights compared with an 
approach that segregates affiliated companies (operating in different states) in their 
insolvencies. 
 
Creditors' expectations and interests with regard to the insolvency location 
Creditors' expectations are fundamental to the issue of international jurisdiction in 
which to handle cross-border insolvencies. [FN6] Since presently there is no prospect of 
achieving unification of domestic insolvency laws, [FN7] placing the proceedings in 
different places (therefore subjecting the process to different legal regimes) will 
undoubtedly affect legal rights of certain creditors. For instance, the ranking of *471 a 
particular debt may be different under different insolvency regimes. Thus, a particular 
creditor may gain a lower (or higher) recovery from the estate of the company according 
to the location in which the proceedings are held. Clearly, creditors should be able to 
foresee where the insolvency of a company is going to take place and calculate their risk 
accordingly. [FN8] 
One view may suggest that, as a rule of thumb, the location of proceedings of any 
member of a group (and the corresponding law and forum that should supervise the 
process) should always be determined for each company separately. That is, without any 
considerations of the connections a particular member may have had with another related 
company or with a "group" (even if this is beneficial for the group as a whole). 
Supposedly, creditors are related to a certain company and not to a group of companies. 
Therefore, they expect to enforce their rights upon it and to open insolvency proceedings 
in the place of its main operations regardless of any possible links to some "group 
centre". In any case, their rights should not be prejudiced because of any "group" 
considerations, as it will not be fair to them. Thus allegedly, in the name of "unification", 
a centralised approach may collide with creditors' expectations and may not fit with their 
views regarding the forum that should supervise the process. [FN9] However, it could be 
that creditors may have actually dealt with a subsidiary as if it was the entire group or 
otherwise were given the impression that the whole weight of the group is behind the 
specific subsidiary they were dealing with. In such cases, treating the insolvent subsidiary 
separately will actually discord with its creditors' expectations. 
Whichever is the case, it is clear that one obstacle that a simplified "segregating" 
approach will have difficulty to face is that different creditors involved with the group 
may have different interests and expectations regarding the location in which a certain 
member's insolvency will be handled. Creditors of a certain subsidiary may wish that the 
company will be separately managed, while the creditors of other related companies 
would expect all proceedings to be conducted jointly since according to their view they 
were given the impression that they deal with the entire group and not only with a well-
bounded part. Moreover, elements of both types of dealing could be found among 
creditors of the same company within a group. In fact, applying the simplified rule of 
treating each company separately without taking into account the group context may 
result in significant unfairness towards the majority of the MCG's creditors. 
Furthermore, more often than not, a thorough examination of the facts pertaining to a 
group's insolvency which was integrated may reveal that it was indeed clear to "locally 
oriented" creditors (of local subsidiaries) that they dealt with a member which was part of 
a group. Evidently, they may have negotiated with a holding company located elsewhere, 
or their contracts may have been subjected to the laws under which the parent company 
was operating. They may have supplied products to other members of the group or had 
other dealings with the various parts of the business. They may have received a guarantee 
from the parent company, and so on. Examining the way the group was operating and 
*472 the way creditors were doing business with the corporation will, therefore, most 
likely point out to a single location from where the group was managed and in which 
insolvency proceedings can be handled for the entire group. It could be conceptualised 
that the genuine expectations of creditors should fit with and stem from the way the MCG 
was actually structured and managed. Therefore, focusing on the "business reality of the 
MCG" could assist the court in verifying creditors' expectations. In addition, the court 
would need to "step back" and look at the way creditors dealt with the group from an 
objective perspective (using the notion of what a "reasonable creditor" would have 
expected in the specific scenario) rather than basing its decision on the expressed 
subjective beliefs of creditors. [FN10] 
There could also be situations where the creditors did not know precisely which entity 
within a group they were dealing with and where it was incorporated or held its main 
operations. Indeed, the increasing complexity of a technologically advanced business 
world (where enterprises may operate through a baffling network of corporate relations) 
leads to greater difficulty in establishing which company within the enterprise is actually 
at fault, making it hard even for more sophisticated creditors to ascertain the proper entity 
against which to open proceedings. In cases of small unsecured creditors, there is an even 
greater difficulty in clearly identifying the corporate actor with whom one was 
contracting or suffered injury. [FN11] 
All in all, it seems that a "global look" on the situation, one that takes into account the 
various entities and creditors involved, is for the creditors' benefit. It is only when 
considering all relevant parties' expectations and interests that a just and fair solution 
could be devised. A particular court will then be able to evaluate all relevant interests and 
expectations and determine whether the creditors as a whole could have ascertained a 
particular location as the centre of the entire group, so that it will be justified to conduct 
the various proceedings of the relevant entities from such identified location, rather than 
handling separate processes in each country hosting a subsidiary. Alternatively, the court 
may conclude that creditors dealt with their debtor on a separable basis with no regard to 
its relations with the group, consequently allowing for the distribution of the proceedings. 
As noted above, in many cases of integrated MCGs it will be evident that creditors 
knew they were dealing with a member of a group, and they actually had relations with 
other members of the group or with the debtor's parent. Yet in certain other cases, it could 
be realised that creditors may have dealt separately with an autonomous subsidiary, 
[FN12] even if this subsidiary was a part of a single *473 unitary business integrated 
within a group. In those particular circumstances where local entities had a significant 
degree of autonomy (which was reflected in the way creditors have dealt with it), it is 
reasonable to assume that such creditors expect to have the main process against the 
particular entity in the country in which it operated. Hence, "shifting" the proceedings to 
a different location can be regarded as unjustified in these scenarios. Nevertheless, as the 
entire MCG is still an integrated enterprise, the creditors as a whole may benefit from 
some sort of centralisation and a common direction in handling the entire insolvency 
process. 
Evidently, it seems most appropriate that a decision regarding the location of 
proceedings should take into account the expectations and views of the group's creditors 
as a whole and not only a specific subset of them. Thus, in order to accurately consider 
the various expectations involved and to reach a just and appropriate decision, one single 
forum should be able to evaluate the various views and decide on the appropriate weight 
each should be given. Consequently, this methodology will be able to accommodate both 
the scenario of creditors expecting to have a sort of unified process for the entire MCG as 
well as the case where creditors dealt with a specific subsidiary as a completely separated 
entity. Thus, it will form a more flexible tool that accords with creditors' expectations and 
the way the enterprise was operated and at the same time provides the benefits of 
centralisation. Conversely, a "one size fits all" mode, according to which proceedings of 
affiliated companies are always handled at a single location or alternatively always 
conducted in separate places with no connection between the various proceedings, will 
not fit with the goal of protecting creditors' rights. 
 
Creditors' forum shopping 
It is not always a matter of genuine expectations that lead creditors to pick up a 
certain jurisdiction in which to open insolvency proceedings against a debtor (belonging 
to a group). Rather, it may sometimes be mere interests (not necessarily or entirely 
"legitimate") that direct creditors to a particular forum. As national regimes differ in their 
dealings with group matters in the context of insolvency, [FN13] creditors may have 
incentives to select a particular forum over another in the event of a group collapse or 
insolvency of any of its members. [FN14] In certain circumstances, local creditors may 
wish to subject certain subsidiaries to local supervision even *474 though they were 
aware of it being an integral part of the MCG (and even though the group as a whole will 
gain profit from a joint process). This could stem from the local insolvency regime being 
better suited to their aims regarding the debtor and/or from their desire to apply close 
control over the insolvency. As this forum manipulation may affect other creditors of the 
MCG and may usually be unfair, applying a centralised approach may prove preferable in 
this respect as well. The strength of such an approach is that it may disregard "pure" 
formalities that may obscure the "real" state of affairs of the group at stake (for example, 
where the group was fragmented into separate entities yet all operated a single business 
directed and managed from a single location). By definition, manipulations can be done 
more easily under a "formal" regime. If the "economic truth" is disregarded and no 
weight is given to the real connections between the companies at hand, unjust outcomes 
are more probable, and the difficulties to "control" manipulations augment. Obviously, 
when the system being used strives to reflect the state of affairs prior to the onset of the 
proceedings and makes use for this end of a broader evaluation of the MCG as a whole, 
creditors' manipulation will be drained of its essence. 
In any case, in order to truly overcome creditors' forum shopping, the method applied 
should designate the place to which the group as a whole has the strongest connection as 
the appropriate forum for the handling of the MCG insolvency process--that is, a centre 
of main interests of the entire enterprise. [FN15] This way parties will find it more 
difficult to "elude" the proper jurisdiction and to choose a different but more favourable 
one when commencing insolvency proceedings. 
 
Rights of involvement and adequate representation in the group context 
The actual course of insolvency within a corporate group may be relevant not only to 
members directly under the proceedings but also to other affiliates which may be located 
in other states. It is very likely that the financial situation of one member may influence 
another, that there may be mutual claims or that there may be questions of group liability. 
These affiliates' insolvency proceedings may take place concurrently in different 
locations, or alternatively they may not be under insolvency at all at that time. In this type 
of case it is particularly important that the wishes and views of creditors of affiliated 
companies will be heard. In this respect, a centralised approach that gives authority to a 
certain court to look at the group insolvency as a whole may ensure that creditors of 
related companies will be given a stage on which they will present their views and that 
they will be taken into account. 
On the other hand, a centralised approach may present a risk of neglecting creditors 
and therefore compromising their involvement and representation rights. Apparently, 
handling the proceedings of each entity separately and locally is better suited to ensure 
the participation of creditors in the process of the subsidiary, to which they directly relate, 
in the easiest and most accessible manner. Conversely, *475 if a subsidiary's insolvency 
is handled in some externally identified centre, certain creditors who might not have the 
sufficient means to embark on a multinational legal expedition (or for any other reason) 
may not be consulted even when a decision that pertains to them (and in which their 
expectations should be taken into account) is made. It could involve, for instance, the 
decision of opening proceedings in a specific location as well as the ongoing handling of 
the proceedings once they were opened. In fact, it may also be the direct consequence of 
a central administration that lacking any explicit guidelines and directions is more likely 
to be concerned with a certain party's needs and expectations while forsaking those of 
other, perhaps more "remote" creditors. 
This scenario also poses the risk of culminating into a de facto substantive 
consolidation [FN16] mostly for the sake of convenience of the administration rather than 
any substantial reason. Thus, separate entities in essence may eventually be lumped 
together without giving full consideration to the expectations of the entire multitude of 
creditors. 
Furthermore, as was indicated with regard to single debtor cross-border insolvencies 
and the use of the EU Regulation, there are practical disadvantages for foreign creditors 
due to language, distance and the differences between procedural requirements imposed 
by states' insolvency laws. [FN17] Applying this notion to the case of insolvencies within 
MCGs suggests that there is a "double" barrier to foreign creditors when they relate to a 
separate entity. 
The problem of inadequate representation and the need for active involvement 
increases since there is a potential conflict of interest in supervising an MCG process in a 
unified manner. The appointee or appointees, if handling the whole proceedings together, 
may be representing different interests. This problem is surely more pronounced when a 
single appointee handles all the proceedings, but it is also quite prominent when there are 
several appointees handling the whole group. In such situations, the appointees are on the 
one hand operating for the benefit of the group as a whole (and the creditors in general), 
but on the other hand are dealing with separate entities that might have contradicting 
interests. In any case, a single appointee or a closely tied group of appointees can result in 
an all too "cosy" situation, with the potential of neglecting certain creditors' interests. 
*476 All in all, a centralised approach seems necessary in order to safeguard the 
rights of involvement and adequate representation when we are dealing with an integrated 
MCG, as this requires for someone in this entire process to see and hear all relevant 
voices and to be responsible to protect all interests. However, the inherent risks of a 
centralised system as introduced above are undeniably relevant to the application of a 
proper approach. Hence, if a proposed approach is to be proved justified, it will need to 
provide mechanisms to overcome these potential flaws. 
 
Some examples of the difficulty under the EU Regulation to protect creditors' rights in 
MCG cases 
The lack of an explicit solution to the particular case of MCGs within the EU 
Regulation poses a threat to the protection of creditors' rights. Recent cases show that 
without clear guidelines and protective measures with regard to the rights of creditors, the 
outcome may involve either insufficient consideration to creditors' rights or otherwise 
increased unwillingness on their part to support a unified process for the group (even 
though such approach would have been for the benefit of the group as a whole). 
Typically in these cases, parties and courts were driven to try and devise practical 
solutions, to enable efficient liquidations or restructurings of MCGs as it was only natural 
that these cases needed such efficient mechanism to be able to reach a successful 
conclusion. However, lacking sufficient structured guidelines, EU courts were sometimes 
inclined towards the direction in which local creditors have pulled: either to protect 
creditors in the "territory" sacrificing the global economic consequences it may have, or 
enforce control over foreign members of a group even in cases where it may not exactly 
fit creditors' expectations. Creditors themselves have been on some occasions reluctant to 
accept any "joint process" as they could not be certain that their rights would be 
preserved during this course of action. 
 
Parmalat 
The Eurofood [FN18] subsidiary company was incorporated in Ireland; however, it 
was part of an Italian group that collapsed (Parmalat). Hence, the Italian administrator 
appointed to restructure the Italian group wished to subject the Irish company to Italian 
jurisdiction in order to facilitate the operation. [FN19] However, creditors of the Irish 
subsidiary were reluctant to accept that. They feared the consequences of such an act and 
could not be confident that their rights would be adequately safeguarded. They were 
concerned, for example, that the assets of the Irish subsidiary would *477 be lumped 
together with those of the rest of the group. [FN20] They preferred to have control of the 
subsidiary's future and thus strove to place its proceedings in Ireland. Consequently, two 
main parallel proceedings were opened. 
Indeed, the Irish court in its decision to approve the appointment of Irish provisional 
liquidators to the subsidiary [FN21] emphasised the Irish company's creditors' 
expectations and how they viewed the company's location. The court held that it was 
clearly Ireland in which the creditors expected a default to be handled as creditors were 
dealing with investments issued in Ireland and subject to Irish fiscal and regulatory 
provisions. [FN22] The Italian court, on the other hand, in its decision to open main 
proceedings in Italy (in relation to the same company) [FN23] seemed to have focused 
more on the entire group's operational structure and the Irish company's position within 
it. It pointed out the fact that the Irish company carried out activities instrumental to the 
Italian parent's group, that it was ancillary to the parent, that the parent guaranteed all 
transactions and that all operating and policy decisions were made from Italy. [FN24] 
Clearly, there was a lack of structured guidelines for the courts to follow in 
determining on the proper jurisdiction where it is a case of group of companies. 
Consequently, each pulled to the other direction to meet the interests of the local creditors 
or the local administrator. The recent decision of the ECJ in the case (upholding the Irish 
court claim to be the proper jurisdiction) [FN25] has not resolved this difficulty. It has 
not provided means aimed at appreciating the benefits for the stakeholders of the group as 
a whole and clarifying how the various relevant interests can be safeguarded and taken 
into account. Rather, it entrenched the idea *478 of ascertaining jurisdiction for each 
subsidiary separately, [FN26] apparently focusing on the ascertainability to third parties 
of the particular company. [FN27] 
The Parmalat case's complexities go beyond the EU Regulation's "borders", yet it 
would be noteworthy to take a look at other courts' and creditors' views in some other 
Parmalat derivatives. A Cayman Islands' court's decision also in a matter related to the 
Parmalat group [FN28] reflects a similar consideration of that of the Irish court. Cautious 
of not depriving creditors of the local subsidiary of their rights, [FN29] the court refused 
to subject this company to the Italian administrator control, approving the appointment of 
separate representatives, although conscious of the effect it might have on the cost-
efficient operation of the whole process. The main reason for the court's decision was the 
fact that this was the wish of third-party creditors (i.e. non-related creditors)--to have 
separate representatives and to conduct a local process--and because of severe concerns 
about the administrator's ability to act in the interest of the subsidiaries' stakeholders. 
Indeed, the way the Parmalat's administration was being handled has been criticised as 
being too nationalised, focusing on seeking "an Italian solution" and lacking a sufficient 
international perspective. [FN30] Creditor groups involved in the Parmalat process 
"raised eyebrows" with regard to the sort of representation provided for such a large-
scale, international case. [FN31] However, such solution as was chosen by the Cayman 
Islands' court (segregation in handling the group's process) poses a threat on the chances 
to engineer a global rescue plan and in any case has probably increased costs and 
complicated the proceedings. Furthermore, it seems that the court (although stating that it 
was mainly concerned with the creditors' wishes) considered only part of the interests 
involved. [FN32] It can be argued that the Cayman Islands' court did not appreciate the 
fact that creditors who were not present at court and may have belonged to other 
members of the group may have had an interest in promoting a centrally based more 
efficient process, supervised by a single administration. 
 
*479 Daisytek 
In the Daisytek case, [FN33] an entire group (the European part) was placed under 
administration in one single place; however, this resulted in much contest from the part of 
the "local" subsidiaries. There was a strong debate regarding the reasoning given by the 
English court when it opened the proceedings against each member of the group, and 
with respect to the representation of the subsidiaries in this process. [FN34] It seems that 
a practical solution was imposed, but with much confusion and discontent on the part of 
foreign members of the group. [FN35] Looking at the reasoning of the English court's 
decision it seems that creditors' expectations with regard to the local subsidiaries' place of 
main interests were considered. [FN36] Furthermore, prima facie the decision was 
grounded on finding COMI separately for each subsidiary. [FN37] 
Nevertheless, it appears that the decision was much influenced by the group situation. 
The court looked at the group's operational structure, and the way it was managed. 
[FN38] It also seems that the English administrator was mainly focused on devising an 
effective solution to the pan-European group. [FN39] The French and *480 German 
courts in first instances, on the other hand, considered the respective companies as locally 
situated, even though they were controlled by a parent company in the United Kingdom. 
[FN40] These contradicting views exemplify that an approach that would expressly 
address the situation of a group will make this issue much clearer, and enable the court to 
use the "high road" to reach its decision. Ultimately, this de facto joint administration 
centralised in the United Kingdom with no clear guidelines as to its operation contained a 
potential danger of prejudicing creditors' rights, for example in progressing from a 
parallel administration to a sort of substantive consolidation. [FN41] 
It is submitted thus that recent experience reinforces the need for an expressed 
authority within a model for cross border insolvency to centralise groups' proceedings 
while providing sufficient rules that will accompany such authority and will protect 
creditors' rights. 
 
A flexible solution focused on the ability to identify a true and predictable centre for the 
entire group 
The starting point of our discussion was that a centralised approach is beneficial in 
terms of economic efficiency in cases of integrated groups. It was consequently evident 
that such an approach has the potential of promoting fairness in that it will enable a 
specific forum to consider creditors' interests and expectations relevant to the group's 
insolvency. Having such a "global look", taking into account the entire picture will result 
with the fairest outcome. All in all, the advantage of such an approach is that in the 
appropriate cases (namely where the MCG was integrated) it can better reflect the 
economic reality of the business. A centralised approach will be able to project the way 
the MCG operated and the way it had dealings with creditors in its ordinary course of 
business onto handling of its insolvency. Therefore, by mirroring the business activities 
prior to the collapse, it will better accord with creditors' expectations, while at the same 
time preventing creditors' manipulations. At its core, a centralised approach subjects the 
entire MCG insolvency process to a single direction. Furthermore though, it strives to 
handle all proceedings in a single location, thus facilitating unification and an appropriate 
"view from above" on the entire process. However, such an approach should be applied 
carefully, recognising that in the case of opening insolvency proceedings the basis of 
assertion of jurisdiction may in fact suggest the assertion of substantive issues as well. 
[FN42] 
Consequently, the main feature of a centralised approach would be to identify the 
location into which proceedings could be centralised. In this respect, the idea of 
identifying a COMI for a single debtor could be extrapolated to identifying *481 a COMI 
for the entire integrated MCG. Thus, a group's COMI should first reflect a real nexus 
between the group and the proper venue to handle the joint process (hence avoiding 
forum shopping [FN43]). For that, it should take into account the group's operation as a 
whole (as opposed to looking for the COMI of each company separately). Furthermore, it 
is important that this centre would be a place easy to identify and to predict, so that it 
would accord with creditors' expectations regarding the insolvency process' location. 
Accordingly, it is suggested that the COMI of a group of companies should be at the 
place where the high-level decision-making regarding the enterprise was performed. That 
is, the COMI should be assigned to the state from which the business was actually 
controlled and managed. Subsidiaries are generally directed from headquarters which 
could be thought of as the brain and nerve centre, while the subsidiaries are the limbs. 
[FN44] The headquarters thus reflect the "meeting point" for the various entities. The 
idea is hence to look for the place of command and control which will usually be located 
where the headquarters are situated. However, it should be the place of actual operating 
headquarters rather than a façade of headquarters. [FN45] Indeed, in several recent EU 
Regulation MCG cases, as well as other MCG cases, proceedings of the various entities 
comprising the group at hand were placed in the jurisdiction in which the management 
and control of the group was situated. [FN46] The place of main decision-making would 
be relatively easy to identify, and would not involve the need to "weight" the amount of 
operations *482 or assets the group may have had in different states (as is the case when 
adopting a "place of principle operations" test). [FN47] 
In addition, in order to diminish the problem of creditors' difficulties in ascertaining 
which corporate entity they were dealing with and where its proper location was (for the 
purpose of insolvency), a centralised approach could also set up rules for transparent 
representation of a company's centre of main interests and its relationship with the rest of 
the group. Namely, there should be an explicit reference within the company's documents 
as to whether it is a company which is integrated with other affiliates and (if indeed this 
is the case) where the centre of main interests of the group is located. This should include 
a positive duty cast on each company (which is a member of an MCG) to proclaim this 
information on its business documents. Furthermore, the company's auditors may be 
asked to validate the accuracy of those representations on an annual basis, and report 
whether indeed it matches the way the business is operating. Such representations can be 
also included in various transactions' documents in which the company is involved. 
[FN48] It may also incorporate statements and prohibitions on any actions taken by the 
company or its affiliates which may result in the alteration of the above location to 
another jurisdiction or the position of the company within the group. This will help in 
robustly protecting creditors and in avoiding the potential gap between "impression" and 
"reality" of the companies' operations and their effects on jurisdiction matters. 
Yet, as a centralised approach is supposed to reflect the actual characteristics of the 
MCG at hand prior to its collapse and creditors' expectations regarding the location of the 
insolvency process, it must acknowledge the fact that even in the case of an integrated 
MCG, various operational structures may be involved. Accordingly, it might not be 
appropriate in certain cases to place all the companies' proceedings in the identified 
centre for the entire group. Typically, this will involve cases of groups that were 
significantly decentralised (the subsidiaries autonomous to a significant degree) although 
operating a single business. [FN49] The approach should *483 thus provide that if indeed 
a local subsidiary of an integrated MCG operated with a substantial autonomy which in 
turn was reflected in how creditors dealt with it, [FN50] its proceedings may be handled 
separately and locally. However, it should still maintain that such local proceedings will 
be subjected to the process conducted in the MCG's centre. 
This flexible methodology will make it possible to contain both the cases in which all 
subsidiaries should be located at the MCG's COMI and those other cases in which certain 
subsidiaries are in fact locally separated. Thus, it will overcome the short-handedness of 
the "black or white" solution imposed via the EU Regulation. Consequently, in cases 
involving local proceedings of autonomous subsidiaries, the place of main decision-
making should be given the supervisory role over the entire process. The amount of 
control exerted over the other affiliates' processes should be appropriated according to the 
circumstances, depending on the specific case and the amount of co-ordination required. 
In addition, some scenarios of MCGs' insolvencies may present difficulty in 
centralising the process or even applying single supervision. For instance, where the 
controlling entity is not under insolvency (e.g. a bundle of insolvent subsidiaries without 
the parent or an individual shareholder), or where the integrated group is divided between 
two sub-groups (a "twin holding" structure [FN51]); it would be difficult to ascertain a 
single place of common control. For these scenarios a "second best" test could be 
provided which will involve the location of the group's main operations mentioned above. 
[FN52] It might be possible in this way to point to one of the affiliate's locations as the 
place with the major volume of assets and activities. However, as this is a problematic 
test, there is a chance it would still be impossible to locate a centre in such cases. If 
indeed a centre could not be identified, and if the parties themselves could not agree on a 
mutual "centre" in which proceedings should be handled, then other global mechanisms 
would need to be imposed in order to achieve the benefits of a linked process. This may 
include close co-ordination and co-operation, mutual recognition, access and relief (as 
provided in cross-border models to single debtors). 
In any case, a global approach will still need to deal with possible strategic 
manipulations that may be taken by debtors, moving the group's headquarters [FN53] or 
using successive filings [FN54] to pick a preferable jurisdiction for the MCG in 
anticipated distress. If the approach will be too fragile and prone to manipulations, *484 
creditors' expectations will not be met and the identified centre most probably will not 
reflect their views with regard to the MCG's operation. In order to overcome 
manipulations of the MCG's centre being taken at the eve of insolvency, a global model 
should look for the real centre of control for a set amount of time prior to the insolvency. 
[FN55] In case there was more than one such place within this period of time the model 
should designate the venue in which the place of control was residing longer. [FN56] It 
should also take into account the entire group situation and preferably place all affiliates 
under the insolvency regime, to avoid the downsides of successive filings by debtors 
related to a group. However, if the entity which exerted control over the various affiliates 
joins the process only after proceedings against the other affiliates already started to a 
substantial level, then it should be permissible to move or alter the supervisory authority 
to the court where this entity is located. 
 Ensuring a transparent process and objectivity in representation 
Even if the circumstances provide that a fully centralised process is compatible, it 
should still address the issue of representation and involvement of foreign creditors in the 
centralised process. Thus, a global approach should ensure that courts will be presented 
with the entire picture when considering the path an MCG insolvency process should take 
or with regard to other matters pertaining to the insolvency (this may include the decision 
on the location of proceedings, the administration and supervision over the process or the 
decision on any sort of consolidation to be imposed, and so on). The court should be able 
to take into account interests of all creditors relevant to the process, appreciating the 
significant consequences of particular decisions on creditors' rights. [FN57] This should 
*485 include foreign creditors, as well as creditors of affiliates who are relevant to the 
process (in the sense that they may be integrated within the group or have other claims 
that should be considered [FN58]--hereinafter, "relevant affiliates"). For that purpose, 
courts and administrators should be responsible for notifying creditors and other 
administrators of relevant affiliates about the opening of proceedings against a particular 
member within the group and of any relevant court hearings and orders. [FN59] 
The parties opening the case should provide full information and evidence in respect 
of the MCG scenario, its way of operation and the financial status of other relevant 
affiliates. Information should also include various matters pertaining to the insolvency 
that may affect other affiliates, such as decisions on the location of the proceedings and 
hearings that are going to take place regarding the application of any specific 
mechanisms needed in the relevant circumstances. [FN60] Creditors of relevant affiliates 
should also get access to proceedings being located in a foreign country and get equal 
treatment in terms of lodging claims to a joint administrator [FN61] and voting on a 
global plan or other sort of insolvency operation (if indeed any sort of joint 
administration was actually applied). Bearing in mind the complex scenario of insolvency 
within an MCG, it should be provided within a centralised approach that creditors' wishes 
should be considered even if they are not physically present. The benefits or possible 
unfairness should be examined with as much consideration as possible of the creditors in 
general. In this process of evaluating creditors' wishes, a fair balance should be made 
between the various interests. The nature of claims is also relevant, namely whether third-
party creditors' wishes are at stake or those of creditors who are also shareholders or 
connected to the former management of the company, embracing the idea that related 
creditors should be entitled to less weight in the overall equation. [FN62] 
Finally, a unified global system should provide rules to ensure the objectivity of the 
administration supervising a group's process and its capability to represent a variety of 
interests relevant in the case of MCG. In this respect, an international firm with an 
international perspective may be more adequate to deal with MCG cases (than a 
nationally oriented administrator), especially those involving large groups *486 operating 
across the globe. Clearly, when the case involves separate entities that operated in 
different states with foreign creditors at stake, problems of potential conflicts of interest 
and inadequate representation of creditors may augment. 
 
Concluding remarks 
It is suggested that a centralised approach to insolvencies within MCGs is, 
principally, for the benefit of the creditors involved with a group. However, this 
conclusion is dependent on providing adequate tools and protective measures to ensure 
that creditors' voices are heard, that they are adequately represented in the process, and 
that a solution which is compatible to the specific scenario is imposed. We have not dealt 
here though with the various means a compatible approach to insolvencies within MCGs 
should encompass in order to deal with substantive issues that may arise in the course of 
an MCG's insolvency. Issues such as abuse within the group or intermingling of assets 
and debts between entities will have profound implications on creditors' rights of equal 
distribution from the insolvent estate. The road to a compatible global approach to 
insolvency within an MCG must pass through these points as well. For the time being, 
though, we will be content with the basic notion that a centralised approach could indeed 
become a creditors' dream. 
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